Private Law: Convetional Obligations by Smith, J. Denson
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 12 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1950-1951 Term
January 1952
Private Law: Convetional Obligations
J. Denson Smith
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
J. Denson Smith, Private Law: Convetional Obligations, 12 La. L. Rev. (1952)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol12/iss2/2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1950-1951 Term
This symposium, presented for the fourteenth time in the
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW, examines the main work of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana during the judicial term from October 1950
to September 1951.
I. Private Law
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
A novel problem involving natural obligations was presented
to the court in Breaux v. Breaux.' Here a legatee transferred to
her son property acquired under the will of her aunt pursuant
to an understanding that the property would go to the son when
he attained his majority. Subsequently the legatee filed suit
against her son to set aside and annul the authentic act by which
she purported to convey the property to him for a price paid in
cash. The defendant admitted that no price was paid but relied
on the claim that the conveyance was supported by a natural
obligation of his mother to carry out the wishes of the testatrix.
In its original opinion the court held that the defense was unavail-
ing because the desire of the testatrix was not defective for want
of form only as provided in Article 1758 but was void in sub-
stance as a prohibited fidei commissum or a substitution. On
rehearing, it seemed to conclude that the "understanding" plain-
tiff had with the testatrix that the property "would go" to the
defendant when he attained his majority imposed, by virtue of
Article 1758 (1), a natural obligation on plaintiff that was neither
immoral nor unjust and was therefore valid cause for the transfer.
Article 1758 (4) imposes a natural obligation on a party who
takes by way of inheritance to execute the dispositions made by
the ancestor that are null for want of form alone. On the other
hand, Paragraph 1 imposes a natural obligation on a promisor to
fulfill an obligation assumed by himself that is null either for
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 218 La. 795, 51 So. 2d 73 (1950) (rehearing 1951).
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want of form or for some reason of general policy but is not in
itself immoral or unjust. An application of these provisions to
the instant case would indicate that if the obligation resting on
the plaintiff arose solely from the act of the testatrix in attempt-
ing a disposition that was invalid not only because lacking in the
required form but also because such a disposition was also pro-
hibited, it could not be characterized as a natural obligation
in view of 1758 (4). On the other hand, if the plaintiff's obligation
stemmed from a promise made by the plaintiff to the testatrix,
then it would appear to fall within the scope of 1758 (1). This
involves the justifiable assumption that the.promise would not be
enforceable as a civil obligation because it would amount indi-
rectly to the accomplishment of a prohibited fidei commissum.
The question would then remain whether the nullity of the
promise would result because fidei commissa are contrary to
general policy or because they are also immoral or unjust. An
answer that they are merely contrary to general policy-and this
was given by the court-would result in sustaining the transfer.
This disposition nevertheless leaves the disturbing thought that
a transfer of the kind here made, if based solely on the, wishes of
the testatrix, would be rendered invalid by Paragraph 4, while
the same transfer, based on a promise made to the testatrix to
carry out her invalid wishes, would be validated by Paragraph 1.
Yet, if the policy of the law, as expressed in 1758 (4) is against
validity, why should this policy be changed merely because a
promise is made to carry out the invalid disposition? This leads
one to believe that the lawmakers did not intend by 1758(1) to
give validity to a transaction that, without a promise to carry it
through, would be invalid under 1758 (4). The conclusion seems
then to follow that when, because of its illicit character, an
intended disposition would not create a natural obligation by its
own force under 1758(4), it cannot be raised to the status of a
natural obligation by the making of a promise in furtherance
thereof. And this would be in keeping with the principle that
natural obligations result from rules imposed primarily in the
interest of the individual as opposed to the public generally.
2
In Succession of Aurianne3 the decedent directed her execu-
tors to pay the balance remaining due on the principal bf a
$15,000.00 long prescribed promissory note after recognizing in
2. See Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW RVIE W 79 (1951).
3. 219 La. 701, 53 So. 2d 901 (1951).
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the will an indebtedness to such extent. The opinion concerns a
claim to the unpaid interest on the note. In rejecting the creditor's
opposition the court held that the mere acknowledgment of the
debt did not operate as a renunciation of the acquired prescrip-
tion so as to revive the entire indebtedness, including interest,
that there was no new promise to pay the debt which would have
such effect, but that the direction to pay the unpaid principal
should be given effect as an expression of an intention to dis-
charge the natural obligation. The court's position seemed to be
that it was merely supporting the executor's duty to see the
testament faithfully executed. In a separate concurring opinion
the chief justice agreed that the testatrix did not intend to
renounce the prescription nor to acknowledge the indebtedness
but took the view that her act was a recognition of a natural
obligation to pay the stated amount and a "giving" in compliance
with Article 1759(1). The court undoubtedly gave effect to the
intention of the testatrix but it may be wondered just how much
the theory of natural obligations actually figured in the case.
The case of Lama v. Manale,4 having previously been re-
manded, returned to the court for solution of the question of
whether a lessor should recover a stipulated penalty of $5.00
per day for 543 days as a consequence of the tenant's failure to
surrender the leased premises. The supreme court, reversing the
lower court, enforced the contract as written, saying that the
provisions of the lease contract were clear and were binding on
the defendant. There was a dissent from Justice Hamiter, who
seemed to rely chiefly on the idea that such a provision should not
be enforced against a lessee who acts in good faith on the advice
of competent counsel.
The case is consistent with the long-established policy toward
the protection of landlords and is in recognition of the principle
that a contract is the law between the parties. The moral is that
lessees should be more careful in confecting their agreements.
When a series of pyramided real estate transactions collapsed
on the withdrawal of the defendant, the real estate agent brought
suit. to recover a claimed commission and,, as assignee, damages
for the defendant's refusal to consummate his agreement to buy
certain property. The court found that the withdrawal was in
order and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.5 In view of the fact that
4. 218 La. 511, 50 So. 2d 15 (1950).
5. Munson v. Larguier, 218 La. 693, 50 So. 2d 808 (1951).
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the action of the agent resulted in a profit to the defendant of
$250.00 which the vendee of defendant's home paid for his release,
the position of Justice McCaleb, in dissenting, that the agent was
entitled to his commission on this transaction because it had been
enforced, in effect, by the vendor, is appealing. Yet it is difficult
to see in defendant's willingness to accept a windfall from his
vendee, any basis for denying him the right to rely on non-
completion of the basic transaction, as far as plaintiff was
concerned.
Nothing novel was presented by the court in Guidry and
Swayne v. Miller.6 The suit was by a contractor for damages
including lost profits on a building contract and was remanded
to permit the contractor to introduce further proof to show how
much he would have spent in completing the contract if he had
not been dismissed by the owner. A similar case was Gowan v.
Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation7 where the court,
enforcing the rule that Article 2765 authorizes recovery of lost
profits, found in favor of the contractor's contention.
The case of Pennington v. Drews seems to have been finally
disposed of on its third trip to the court. The court rejected the
plaintiff's claim for penalties of $25.00 per day amounting to
$34,475.00, concluding that the stipulated penalty was recoverable
under the contract only if the defendant refused to render serv-
ices involving the use of his oil exploration device while specific
work was in progress. It found that no specific work was in
progress when the refusal to work occurred. There was a dis-
senting opinion by Justice Moise.
There was a failure to satisy the burden of proof required by
Article 2277 in Fleury v. Ramos.0 The court applied the rule that
the findings of the trial judge on questions of fact are entitled to
great weight.
A contract for the removal of a gas line was found voidable
because of misrepresentation and error in Sylvester v. The Town
of Ville Platte'0 and the court remanded the case so that there
could be a determination of how much the plaintiff was entitled
to on a quantum merit.
6. 217 La. 935, 47 So. 2d 721 (1950).
7. 217 La. 935, 47 So. 2d 721 (1950).
8. 218 La. 258, 49 So. 2d 5 (1949) (on rehearing 1950).
9. 218 La. 293, 49 So. 2d 17 (1950).
10. 218 La. 419, 49 So. 2d 746 (1950).
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